Summary. This paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies in which the individuals' endowments depend on privately observed effort choices and the financial markets are endogenous. The environment is modeled as a two-stage game. Individuals first make strategic financial-innovation decisions. They then act in a Radner-type economy with the previously designed securities. Consumption goods, portfolios, and effort levels are chosen competitively (i.e., taking prices as given). An equilibrium concept is adapted for these moral hazard economies and its existence is proven. It is shown through an example how incentive motives might lead to the endogenous emergence of financial incompleteness.
. This paper extends the innovation analysis to general equilibrium economies with moral hazard. Moral hazard adds a new trade-off to the financial-innovation decision. On the one hand, individuals have an interest in issuing new securities in order to hedge risks posed by uncertainty. On the other hand, as is well-known from partial equilibrium models, higher insurance possibilities reduce effort incentives. The strategic balance of incentives and risk-sharing possibilities is an important aspect of financial innovation which is still unexplored in a general equilibrium context. This paper models a class of general equilibrium economies with moral hazard and endogenous financial markets. Each individual is endowed with a productive project whose output depends on one's privately observed effort. The support of the output distribution is finite, so that the economy has a finite number of states of nature. In this world, a security is characterized by a vector of contingent payments and a list of transaction constraints. The setup consists of a two-stage game. First, individuals strategically make their financial-innovation decisions. Any individual is allowed to open a clearinghouse and issue securities in zero net supply. Once the financial market is designed, individuals act in a Radner-type economy in which consumption goods, portfolios, and effort levels are chosen competitively (i.e., as a best response to other effort levels, but taking prices as given).
The equilibrium concept combines strategic and competitive elements. 1 Individuals are atomistic, but they understand that the financial-innovation decision directly affects the economy's equilibrium. Therefore, when making such a decision, they act strategically and anticipate relevant elements of the second stage, such as equilibrium prices and quantities. Once the financial market has been designed, individuals choose consumption bundles, portfolios, and effort levels taking prices as given. In this second stage, individuals bear in mind the fact that their effort choices affect probabilities, but act as if all their choices had no effect on prices. Price taking is a fundamental behavioral assumption in the competitive tradition. Price-taking behavior associated with strategic effort choice is also assumed in Arnott and Stiglitz [5] and Citanna and Villanacci [14] to study multi-good moral hazard economies.
The modeling strategy here allows one to use standard techniques to prove the existence of an equilibrium. In the first stage of the game, intermediaries are allowed to use mixed strategies. They have expectations about future allocations and prices. These expectations are modeled through endogenous sharing rules, as in Simon and Zame [31] . In this way, one can prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the financial-innovation subgame. (This same technique is used in Bisin [8] .) Once the financial assets have been designed, individuals act in a competitive economy with moral hazard. The non-existence problem raised by Helpman and Laffont [23] and Bisin and Gottardi [9] and [10] is avoided by means of a convexity assumption that allows the application of Kakutani's fixed-point techniques.
The model incorporates many important features of real-world financial markets, such as the possibility of credit rationing, redundant securities, bilateral ar-rangements, financial clubs, anonymous competitive assets, and latent contracts (those that are not transacted in equilibrium, but are issued to inhibit other innovations). The equilibrium financial structure is typically incomplete due to incentive reasons. This point is illustrated through a simple example. Furthermore, the equilibrium tends not to implement the second-best allocation. An important source of inefficiency is the fact that securities are non-exclusive (i.e., individuals can trade multiple assets with different intermediaries).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature; Section 3 describes the basic model; Section 4 presents the equilibrium concept, proves its existence, and discusses some features and possible extensions of the model; Section 5 illustrates how moral hazard can generate financial incompleteness; and Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
Related papers from two different fields are discussed here. Initially, a few selected topics on financial innovation are mentioned. (More detailed reviews can be found in Allen and Gale [3] , Duffie [16] , and Duffie and Rahi [17] .) The literature on moral hazard is then briefly summarized.
It is well-known that any equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal in competitive economies with complete markets. This is an important benchmark for the financialinnovation analysis. It is also known that issuing an arbitrarily new security need not be Pareto improving when financial markets are incomplete. In fact, Cass and Citanna [12] and Elul [18] and [19] show that, generically, there exists a Pareto improving financial innovation when markets are incomplete. However, as stressed in Cass and Citanna [12] and Elul [18] , introducing a new asset into an economy with multiple goods and incomplete financial markets can move the vector of equilibrium utilities in any direction (so that, in particular, innovation could also make everyone worse-off). Thus, in the presence of exogenous frictions, the choice of which assets should exist has important welfare effects. This motivates the research agenda on optimal security design.
Many papers on financial innovation focus on the trade-off between profitable innovation and costly financial intermediation. Allen and Gale [1] and [2] study the optimal use of debt and equity to finance an endogenously chosen production plan in an incomplete markets context. Chen [13] shows that arbitrage valuation does not hold in frictional economies and that short-selling restrictions create value for securitization. Pesendorfer [27] models intermediaries designing new securities collateralized by standard assets and shows that the equilibrium financial structure may exhibit redundancies even when marketing a new security is costly. Bisin [8] shows that financial incompleteness endogenously arise in general equilibrium economies with profit-maximizing intermediaries facing intermediation costs.
Another group of papers studies single-good economies with normally distributed endowments, CARA utility functions, and asymmetric information (e.g., Rahi [30] and Demange and Laroque [15] ). In rational expectations equilibria, securities provide hedge and transmit private information; this approach allows one to obtain explicit solutions for the optimal security design. Duffie and Rahi [17] present a detailed survey on these papers.
Moral hazard is another important element in this paper. The standard literature on this issue represents the equilibrium by a contract that solves the principal-agent problem (e.g., Grossman and Hart [22] ). In the multi-agent setup, a benevolent planner (principal) allocates the economy's resources among individuals in order to solve the trade-off between incentives and risk sharing (e.g., Prescott and Townsend [28] ).
An implicit assumption of these models is that individuals cannot obtain insurance from any other party besides the principal (exclusivity assumption). Exclusivity, however, might be difficult to implement in general equilibrium economies with competitive financial markets. Helpman and Laffont [23] present a general equilibrium analysis of moral hazard economies with exogenously complete asset markets where transactions are non-exclusive. Endogenizing the financial design is an important extension to be done, since complete markets need not be optimal in economies with moral hazard.
Non-exclusivity is also studied by other authors in different contexts. Jaynes [24] , Arnott and Stiglitz [6] , and Bisin and Guaitoli [11] model insurance companies offering non-exclusive contracts contingent on two possible events (accident and no accident). Similarly, Kahn and Mookherjee [25] model an economy where individuals make sequential offers to intermediaries, who cannot contract upon the transactions made previously with other intermediaries. These papers focus on economies with a single consumption good and insurance contracts offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, so that there is no price to be determined in equilibrium. Their results suggest that exclusivity is necessary for second-best efficiency of the equilibrium in moral hazard economies.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on common agency, which features multiple principals designing independent arrangements to a single agent (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston [7] ).
An economy with moral hazard
Consider an economy with L ≥ 1 consumption goods and I > 1 individuals. Each individual, i ∈ I = {1, ..., I}, is endowed with a productive project, a financialinnovation technology, and a unit of time to be allocated for leisure, I . In order to ensure that the output realization is non-informative about effort choices, assume that every state occurs with positive probability regardless of the effort vector, namely, inf
Preferences Individuals care about their contingent consumption,
, and leisure, i ∈ [0, 1]. They also care about the vector of effort levels, e ∈ [0, 1] I , since it affects the probability of each state of nature. Assume that individual i's preference relation is represented by a continuous and quasiconcave utility func-
.., L(S + 1); and (iii) there exist continuous and strictly positive partial derivatives
∂U i ∂x i n : R L(S+1) ++ × [0, 1] 1+I → R ++ , ∀n = 1, .
.., L(S + 1).

Timing
In this economy, there is no exogenous financial market. Before the beginning of period zero, all individuals are allowed to open clearinghouses and design securities in order to hedge the risk of unfavorable states of nature. This environment is represented by a two-stage game. Initially, individuals in I simultaneously choose a financial-innovation strategy. Next, they act in a competitive economy where: (i) before the realization of uncertainty, they choose a period-zero consumption bundle, 
Financial innovation
In the first stage of the game, each individual is allowed to design a financial structure with J i securities. Securities are in zero net supply and individuals (including the issuer) take long and short positions in each asset designed. The financial structure issued by individual i, i , consists of payoffs and transaction constraints.
are not necessary, since the individuals'choices of effort always affect each other via prices-a pecuniary effect defined by Greenwald and Stiglitz [21] as moral hazard pecuniary externality.
• Payoffs: Security j's payoff is represented by a vector, a j ∈ R S , determining the amount of good 1 to be transferred in each state of nature. Each individual i must design exactly J i securities, but the choice a j = 0 is interpreted as the non-issuing decision. 3 Hence, there is a total of J = i∈I J i securities in the economy, and those designed by individual i are indexed by
• Transaction constraints: Due to the presence of moral hazard, issuers might have an interest in restricting the participation of some individuals in some markets. They are allowed to do so by imposing personal constraints on short and long transactions. Namely, the issuer of security j chooses λî buy,j , λî sell,j î∈I ∈ R 2I + , where λî buy,j and λî sell,j represent the maximum amount of security j that individualî is allowed to buy and sell, respectively. 4 Remark 1 Transaction constraints are allowed to depend on the individuals' names, i ∈ I. This assumption is appropriate because the individuals'efforts have stochastic impact over specific states of nature. Personal transaction constraints expand the set of possible contracts, since they allow trading exclusion of individuals whose effort choices would compromise the implementation of a certain security. In particular, these constraints allow the existence of bilateral arrangements and financial clubs (which could be implemented by setting λî buy,j = λî sell,j = 0 for non-members).
Remark 2
It is important to stress that each intermediary chooses transaction constraints for the securities personally issued, but not for the securities issued by others. Therefore, these constraints do not implement trading exclusivity.
Intermediation cost
In order to rule out equilibria with weakly dominated strategies, let us assume that financial innovation is not free. Whenever i = 0, individual i must expend an infinitesimal amount of time,τ i ∈ (0, 1), to enforce transactions. This assumption is important to avoid innovations made by those who would have nothing to gain or lose with such a decision. More complex cost structures could be easily incorporated in this model. However, it is important to stress that intermediation costs are not driving the results here.
In short, the parameters (
Individuals who choose to issue at least one security are called intermediaries; the set of financial intermediaries is endogenously characterized by H = {i ∈ I : i = 0}.
Competitive markets
After observing the financial structure issued in the initial node, = ( 
Equation ( ++ , and portfolio value to buy consumption goods. Therefore, the individuals' choices must also satisfy:
Definition 1 Individual i's budget set associated with the financial design is
B i (q, p) = {(x i , i , e i ) ∈ R L(S+1) + ×[0, 1] 2 : ∃ z i ∈ R J such that (1)-(4) hold}.
Equilibrium
Before defining the equilibrium concept, it is worth summing up the entire setup in a single assumption.
Assumption 1 The economy ξ is defined as follows:
Players: a finite set of individuals (I);
States: a period zero and a finite set of period-one states of nature (S);
Preferences: for each i ∈ I, there is a continuous and quasiconcave func-
.., L(S + 1); and (iii) there exist continuous and strictly positive partial derivatives
Financial technology:
The equilibrium concept is presented in Definition 7. Since the economy ξ is modeled as a finite-horizon sequential game, this concept is characterized backwards.
Last subgame
In each possible node of the last subgame ( ), individuals choose consumption, portfolio, and allocation of time in a general equilibrium economy with exogenous financial markets.
Definition 2 A competitive equilibrium associated with is a vector
(ii) all markets clear, i.e., i∈I (
The equilibrium concept for the last subgame combines the competitive and Nash concepts. It is a competitive equilibrium concept in the sense that individuals take prices as given, and it is a Nash equilibrium concept in the sense that each individual reacts to the other individuals'effort choices (e * −i ). Note that individuals do not consider the effect of their effort decision on prices (prices are always taken as given). As mentioned before, price taking is a fundamental behavioral assumption in the competitive tradition. Also, moral hazard models with multiple goods usually associate price-taking behavior with strategic effort choice (e.g., Arnott and Stiglitz [5] and Citanna and Villanacci [14] ). Lemma 1 in the Appendix proves the existence of such an equilibrium for a general set of financial structures.
First subgame
In the initial node, individuals face a financial innovation decision. Anticipating the competitive equilibria associated with each financial design, individuals in I move simultaneously and design a financial structure, i ∈ Γ i , to maximize their expected utility payoff, v i . The reduced game is then given by {I,
The strategy space (Γ i )
The strategy space Γ i consists of issued and non-issued securities. Non-issued securities are represented by j = (a j , (λî buy,j , λî sell,j )î ∈I ) = 0. The payoffs of issued securities are normalized to satisfy a j = max (| a 1,j |, . .., | a S,j |) = 1. Moreover, following Radner [29] , it is assumed that any promise to deliver more than the aggregate supply of the commodity is not credible. This imposesȳ 1 = max s i∈I y i 1,s as a natural upper bound for the sales of any issued security. Since each individual sells at mostȳ 1 units of each security issued, no one will be able to buy more than (I − 1)ȳ 1 units of those securities. These restrictions make the strategy space compact.
Definition 3 For any i ∈ I, individual i's strategy space in the initial node is
The expected utility payoffs (v i )
The individuals' expected utility payoffs in the first subgame are real numbers associated with each asset structure, i.e., v( . However, the possibility of multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out. In this case, v( ) must reflect the individuals' beliefs about what competitive equilibrium would be played in the second subgame. These beliefs are modeled as endogenous sharing rules, in the spirit of Simon and Zame [31] .
Start by defining Ξ( ) as the set of all competitive equilibria associated with the financial structure ∈ Γ . 
Definition 4 Ξ is a correspondence mapping financial designs into competitive equilibria. Formally,
Ξ : Γ → R L(S+1)I + × [0, 1] 2I × R JI+J+L(S+1
is a competitive equilibrium associated with (see Definition 2).
Next, let V ( ) = (V 1 ( ), ..., V I ( )) be the set of all utility possibilities associated with the financial design . Formally,
The elements of V ( ) are the utility payoffs that can be achieved in each of the competitive equilibria in Ξ( ). Note that v ∈ R I (rather thanR I ) because U i (·) = −∞ never occurs in equilibrium (see Lemma 1 in the Appendix). Now, define ∇( ) as the convex hull of V ( ). 5 From the definition of convex hull, any element in ∇( ) can be written as a convex combination of the elements in V ( ). Moreover, any convex combination of utility payoffs in V ( ) must belong to ∇( ). Therefore, since V is the correspondence of all possible utility payoffs, ∇ is the set with all possible expected utility payoffs.
Definition 5 ∇( ) is the convex hull of
Then, define v = (v 1 , ..., v I ) as a measurable function selected from ∇. Since ∇( ) defines the universe of all possible expected utility payoffs associated with , v( ) is a particular choice that reflects the individuals' beliefs regarding which competitive equilibria would be played when the asset structure is .
Definition 6 v : Γ → R
I is a Borel measurable function selected from ∇ : Γ → R I .
The solution
Each individual chooses a strategy (potentially mixed) to maximize the expected utility payoff, v i (·). Let B i be the Borel sigma-algebra for Γ i , and Λ Γ i be the set of probability measures on (Γ i , B i ). Thus, individual i's financial-innovation strategy is a probability measure σ i ∈ Λ Γ i that is chosen as a best response to the other individuals' strategies (σ −i ). Formally, the financial-innovation problem faced by each individual i ∈ I is:
When making the issuing decision, individuals must balance aggregate effort incentives and personal risk sharing. By issuing a new security, one improves one's personal risk sharing, but also changes the probability distribution over the states of nature (since insurance affects the individuals' effort choices).
Definition 7 An Equilibrium with Endogenous Financial Markets consists of a Borel measurable function selected from ∇ and financial-innovation strategies, namely
v = (v 1 , ..., v I ) and σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ I ), such that σ i solves (5), given σ −i , for all i ∈ I.
Theorem 1 There exists an Equilibrium with Endogenous Financial Markets for economy ξ.
Proof. See appendix.
Further comments
Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of a solution for the two-stage game defined in this paper. The equilibrium financial design may present many real-world features, such as anonymous competitive securities (those whose transaction constraints were non-binding for all individuals); bilateral arrangements and financial clubs (i.e., markets in which participation is restricted); redundant securities; and latent contracts (those not traded in equilibrium, but issued to affect other intermediaries' strategies).
Financial markets also tend to be incomplete. As is well-known from partial equilibrium models, imperfect risk sharing is an important generator of effort incentives. Section 5 elaborates on this topic through a simple example.
Furthermore, the Equilibrium with Endogenous Financial Markets tends not to implement the second-best allocation. There are many sources of inefficiency. First, the financial technology and the strategic nature of financial innovation are, per se, causes of inefficiency. For instance, as in Pesendorfer [27] and Bisin [8] , the asset structure may present redundant securities even when there are fixed costs associated with the financial-innovation technology. The shape of U i (x i , i , e) can also be important in driving the equilibrium to be constrained inefficient. As noted by Arnott and Stiglitz [5] , in economies with multiple consumption goods and utility functions which are non-separable in leisure, competitive commodity prices will almost always fail to implement the second-best allocation. 6 However, the main source of inefficiency is related to the fact that contracts are non-exclusive. It is known that second-best allocations tend to underinsure individuals (due to the trade-off between insurance and incentives), so that there would be groups interested in deviating from these allocations. Here, these individuals would be able to deviate by introducing new securities. 7 Inefficiency of moral hazard economies with non-exclusive contracts was first discussed by Richard Arnott and Joseph Stiglitz in some unpublished papers in the early eighties (as mentioned in Bisin and Guaitoli [11] ). Since then, an extensive literature, which includes Helpman and Laffont [23] , Jaynes [24] , Arnott and Stiglitz [6] , Bisin and Guaitoli [11] , and Kahn and Mookherjee [25] , has addressed this problem. These analyses suggest that exclusivity would be necessary for second-best efficiency.
Possible extensions
The model presented here could be extended in many directions. For instance, it would be more realistic to allow individuals to charge for the intermediation service through a non-linear price schedule. The existence of an equilibrium would then obviously depend on the type of price schedule that is allowed. It is worth mentioning that the equilibrium would still exist if intermediaries were allowed to choose bid-ask spreads to be charged from traders, in the spirit of Bisin [8] . Although interesting, allowing for intermediation profits would introduce a new dimension to the financial-innovation decision without changing the main trade-off between incentives and risk-sharing possibilities. Moreover, profits would not be an important element in the analysis insofar as all individuals were able to issue securities at an infinitesimal cost.
Other possible extensions could explore different forms of relaxing the nonexclusivity problem. For instance, infinite repetition of the financial-innovation game could implement cooperation among financial intermediaries, alleviating this problem. However, introducing dynamics into the model complicates the analysis. Time raises the possibility of using the history to provide intertemporal incentives. As a consequence, long-lived contracts and time-dependent strategies would have to be considered. These issues are out of the scope of this paper. 6 Another potential source of inefficiency, which is unrelated to moral hazard, comes from the fact that individuals choose competitive securities in a multi-good economy with potentially incomplete markets. As remarked by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [20] , individuals generically do not incorporate the pecuniary externalities of their portfolio decisions when markets are incomplete. However, it must be noted that markets are exogenously incomplete in that paper. Lisboa [26] argues that generic arguments may not be valid for economies with endogenous financial markets. Endowments and utilities in a set of measure zero may be exactly those associated with a particular financial structure when such a structure is endogenous. 7 Intermediaries are allowed to set constraints on transactions made in their clearinghouse, but these constraints do not guarantee exclusivity. Intermediaries have no control over trades in the securities issued by the others.
Illustration
In order to illustrate how moral hazard can generate financial incompleteness, consider a simple economy with two individuals, no consumption in period zero, and a single consumption good in period one. Individual 1 is risk neutral and produces a constant level of output,ȳ 1 . Individual 2 is risk averse and faces a random production that delivers y 2 high > 0 units of the good with probability δ + βe 2 and y 2 low ∈ (0, y 2 high ) units with probability (1 − δ − βe 2 ), where δ and β are strictly positive and δ + β < 1. The set of states of nature is then:
, where u(0) = −∞, and u(·) and g(·) are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and C 2 . Furthermore, g (·) is sufficiently negative to make U 2 (·) concave, andȳ 1 is sufficiently large to ensure that individual 1 is able to insure individual 2.
Individual 1 has no effort choice to make (e 1 = 0), and individual 2's optimal effort must satisfy:
where θ 0 and θ 1 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers of the restrictions e 2 ≥ 0 and
respectively. This expression provides a simple rationale for market incompleteness. Since g (·) < 0, there is a positive relation between effort and the difference between the consumption level in the two states of nature. Thus, the higher the risk-sharing possibilities, the lower the effort level. In fact, it can be shown that e 2 = 0 in the equilibrium with complete markets.
Complete markets
Suppose that individuals can trade two Arrow-Debreu securities at prices p s1 and p s2 . Forȳ 1 sufficiently large, one must have
πs 2 (e 2 ) in any equilibriumotherwise individual 1 would be willing to buy more than the aggregate endowment of the good in one of the states.
From individual 2's necessary and sufficient first-order conditions, one has:
Note from (6)- (7) that
1−π(e 2 ) implies x 
, 2}, constitute the competitive equilibrium when markets are complete.
Incomplete markets
By taking prices as given, individual 2 does not incorporate the effect of effort on the equilibrium prices. As a consequence, one ends up trapped in an equilibrium where insurance is costly and the bad state occurs with high probability. In this economy, social welfare could be improved if individual 2 faced fewer insurance possibilities (either through missing assets or through trading constraints). For instance, consider a second-best allocation (x
2 ) which solves the following problem:
e ∈ argmax
For appropriate parameters, one has y ). Given this financial design, the allocation (
for i ∈ {1, 2}, and
1−π(ê 2 ) constitute an equilibrium. This incomplete financial structure Pareto dominates complete markets and would naturally arise as an Equilibrium with Endogenous Financial Markets in different circumstances. 8 It is worth noting that this economy does not present the elements discussed in Section 4.3 that typically yield equilibrium (second-best) inefficiency.
Conclusion
Incompleteness is an intriguing feature of modern financial markets. The literature on financial innovation uses the trade-off between innovation revenues and intermediation costs to explain incompleteness as an equilibrium outcome. This paper extends the analysis of optimal security design to economies with moral hazard. The motivation for this extension is the existence of incompleteness explained by incentive problems associated with hidden actions. For instance, unemployment insurance is typically incomplete, in the sense that individuals are not able to equalize earnings across employed and unemployed states. Also, in agricultural markets, future and forward contracts provide insurance against the risk of price variations, but no contract covers the risk inherent to production. These types of incompleteness are clearly motivated by the fact that, once hedged, workers and farmers would have no interest in making efforts to avoid the undesirable states.
The paper presents a decentralized general equilibrium approach to the moral hazard problem where, instead of having a principal determining the allocation, individuals endogenously choose the financial span. Incomplete financial markets emerge as part of the equilibrium incentive structure. The equilibrium tends not to be optimal (in the second-best sense).
A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
The proof requires the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 There exists a competitive equilibrium associated with each ∈ Γ.
Proof. Given the assumptions on preferences and endowments (see 10 Furthermore, summing (4) over i and using the fact that i∈I z * i = 0, one gets p
